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THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE IN RECESSION
AND RECOVERY
THE movements of prices, of production and of purchasing
power during recession and recovery in the United States
were aspects of world-wide swings. It is true that national
economic boundaries have been more sharply drawn in re-
cent years, but the world retains many qualities of a single
economic unit. Whether we will or no, we are affected by
the major forces that influence the course of economic events
in other industrial countries. We shall better understand
domestic movements, therefore, if at this point we survey in
a general way the world situation created by recession, and
follow the major changes of more recent years in the cur-
rents of world trade and the fluctuations of prices and costs
in important industrial areas. In some respects these have
paralleled the internal shifts discussed in tracing the course
of events in the United States, but the world picture is painted
on a much broader canvas. And the restoration of a normal
volume of world trade involves, of course, many elements
quite foreign to the domestic situation.
1929aggregateworld production and the physical
volume of world trade reached a peak, for the post-War
decade. Fairly steady progress during the preceding five years
had brought substantial recovery, in respect of physical ac-
tivity, from the depressed conditions of the early years of
the decade. World-wide recession in 1929 reversed this move-
ment. Within three years world production of primary prod-
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ucts—crude foodstuffs and industrial raw materials—declined
about i o per cent. The volume of manufactures and construc-
tion dropped more sharply. The physical volume of world
trade fell 26 per cent. The number of unemployed workers
throughout the world increased, by rough estimate, from
some ten million in 1929 to about thirty million in 1932.' By
that year the major force of the recession was spent. The four
years following brought conflicting movements. Moderate
improvement occurred in some areas; deflation persisted in
others. Numerous obstacles impeded a restoration of full
activity, but in general the forces of recovery dominated the
diverse cross-currents of change of the period 1932—36. On a
world view, these were years of halting revival.
The price changes that accompanied this tremendous eco-
nomic upheaval were more extreme than the physical move-
ments. Our present concern is with the alterations that
occurred within the world price structure under the impact
of recession and the stimulus of revival.
.
RECESSIONAND RECOVERY IN WORLD PRICES: A GENERAL
VIEw.
A general picture of the sweep of the recession as it spread
swiftly from country to country through the delicate mech-
anism of international price relations has been given in
Chapter I. The measurements there employed relate to na-
tional currencies, an appropriate procedure when chief in-
terest attaches. to domestic conditions in the various coun-
tries. But the picture is quite incomplete if such changes
alone are considered. For during the period covered by this
record country after country departed from the gold stand-
'Cf. World Economic Survey, 1932_33(Leagueof Nations, Geneva,
p. 109.164 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ard; dual currency systems were created throughout the
world. The concurrent existence of gold standard and non-
gold standard currencies exerted a great influence on the
course of price movements and on the general economic
fortunes of the various countries concerned.
TABLE 9
PRICE RECESSION IN THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES; 1928-1936
A SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES




DATE OF PRE- LOWEST POINT HIGH TO
RECESSION HIGH WAS REACHED. LOWEST FIGURE
Japan 8 October 1929March 1935 —71
Argentina S May 1928May 1934
Peru March 1929November —67
Egypt (Cairo) November 1928September —66
Australia September 1929March 1935 —64
India(Calcutta) September 1929 1935 —64
Estonia 8 March 1929April —62
Denmark 8 February1929March 1935 —6i
Sweden May 1928March 1935 —59
Chile 8 March .1929March'935 —58
New Zealand September 1929March 1935 —58
Norway August 1928March 1g35 —58
Canada August 1929August1935 —57
Dutch East Indies 2 May 1929March 1936
United Kingdom March 1929March 1935 —57
Jugoslavia 8 May 1928August1934 —57
Belgium 8 March 1929April 1935 —56
Finland August 1928March —56
Bulgaria 8 April 1929January1934 —55
Union of South AfricaOctober 1928April 1935 —55
United States July 1929April 1934
Spain 8 December1928September 1934 . —53
Netherlands2 March 1929April 1933 —52
France 2 .March 1929July 1.935 —51.
Hungary 8 March 1929November 1933 —48THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 165
TABLE g (cont.)




DATE OF PRE- LOWEST POINT HIGH TO
RECESSION i-UGH WAS REACHEDLOWEST FIGURE
Poland 2 March 1929March 1936 —48
Italy a March 1929May 1934 —47
Czechoslovakia 3 February1929April 1934 —43
Austria S May 1929April 1933 —40
Switzerland 2 July 1929March'935 —4°
Latvia 3 March 1928June 1934 —38
Germany 3 July 1928April —36
SOURCES: League of Nations Year-Book, 1934—35; pp. 219 fJ;.Monthly Bulletin
of Statistics, League of Nations, Geneva.
1 For an explanation of procedure, see Appendix IX.
2Countrieson gold March 1936.8 Official foreign exchange control.
The character of the world price recession, in gold values,
is indicated by the entries in Table 9. The various national
index numbers are not fully comparable, since they differ
in respect of the number and character of commodities in-
cluded and in technical methods of calculation. Under iden-
tical economic conditions, in recession, these differences
would cause some variations among the declines recorded.
However, variations due to instrumental differences of this
sort would be far smaller than those actually recorded. It
would be well if we had comparable index numbers for
different countries, but in default of these we may use the
measurements 'available, recognizing that some of the dif-
ferences observed may be instrumental rather than truly
economic.
The price declines of recession, in gold values, ranged
frOm 36 per cent for Germany to 71 per cent for Japan. The
median decline for the thirty-two countries was 56 per cent,
aslcornpared with a median decline of 36 per cent in termsPkICES IN RECESSION RECOVERY
of national currencies (see Chapter I). The declines in gold
prices were more severe and, as is to be expected, show less
variation from country to country than do the measurements
based on national currencies. In general, the average decline
of wholesale prices in terms of gold values was less in gold
standard countries than in non-gold countries.
We may carry the comparison of price movements in gold
standard and non-gold standard countries through recovery
as well as recession (Table io and Figure 7). For this pur-
TABLE 10
MOVEMENTS OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN GOLD STANDARD
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TABLE 10(cont.)
MOVEMENTSOF WHOLESALE PRICES IN GOLD STANDARD AND
NON-GOLD STANDARD COUNTRIES, 1929-1936
NET CHANGE (PER CE NT)
MARCH 1929 TO AUGUST 1931 TO 1933 TO
AUGUST 1931 MARCH 1933 MARCH 1936
Countries off Countries off Countriesoff





cur- in cur- in0cur- in
rencygold rencygold rencygold
Denmark 1 —29 +13 —36 +iS—3
Egypt (Cairo)—25 —24 —47 +26+9
Finland —19 ±1°—33 +2 —13
India(Calcutta) .—36 —ii —37 +11—5
Italy' —34 —13 _15 +21 +144
Jugoslavia 1 —31 —9 —29 +5+3
Norway —20 +1 —34 +9—8
Sweden —24 —4 —35 +12—6
Union of
South Africa—i6 2 _33 _373 +11_45
United Kingdom —2 —3' +12—4
Argentina 1 —12 —41 —2 —11 +16 —27
Australia —22 —40 —5 —3° +12—4
Japan 1 —33 —26 +17 —5° +8 —13
New Zealand —to —i8 —2 —39 +5—9
Peru —8 —36 0 —41 +11 0
Spain' +2 —40 —8 —ii +6+'
Median change
Unweighted—26 —'1 —38 —i6—4 —32+2 +11—6
Weighted 6—25 —22 —4C —17—2 —31+8 +12—8
Number of countries 26 6 6 12 20 20 8 24 24
Official foreign exchange control (as of March 1936).
2April 1929 to July 1931. SJuly 1931 to April 1933.
4 March to October 1935. 5 April 1933 to April 1936.
6 In computing the weighted median, the weight of each country is based
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pose we divide the period of recession and recovery into
three parts: March 1929 to August 1931(GreatBritain de-
pa.rted from the gold standard in September 1931); August
1931 to March 1933 (the United States departed from the
gold standard in April '933); March '933 to March 1936.
(Thefirst phase is dated from March 1929,asthat month
marked the high point of prices in a considerable number of
European countries.)
From March 1929
weighted) decline of w
on the gold standard
cent. For six countries
to August 1931themedian(un-
holesale prices in twenty-six countries
during the entire period was 26 per
not on the gold standard at the end of
the period we have two sets of records for comparison with
this figure. Wholesale prices in these countries suffered a me-
dian decline of i i per cent, in terms of national currencies.
In gold equivalents, the median decline in these six countries
amounted to 38 per cent. Departure from the gold standard
was apparently associated with less drastic declines in do-
mestic prices. In terms of gold, however, prices in the coun-
tries off the gold standard fell even more sharply than did
prices in gold standard countries. This accentuated decline
of gold prices in countries off the gold standard tended, in
so far as international trade competition persisted, still fur-
ther to depress prices in countries remaining on the gold
standard.
The next period of nineteen months covers the interval
between the dropping of. the gold standard by Great Britain
and by the United States. In the twelve countries remaining
on the gold standard prices continued to decline at about
the rate prevailing during the preceding period of twenty-
nine months. The median decline for these countries was i6
per cent. The twenty countries off the gold standard show
median price declines of 4 per cent in terms of their re-
spective national currencies. The history of the earlier period170 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
repeated itself, except that the group of non-gold standard
countries was much larger and economically more signifi-
cant. Where currencies were depreciated the drop in do-
mestic prices was checked. Great Britain's decline of 29 per
cent during the first period was followed by a decline of only
2 per cent in the second period. But the very move that
served to check domestic declines exerted a downward pres-
sure on world gold prices. The gold equivalents of the na-
tional currencies of the twenty countries off the gold standard
during this second period suffered a median decline of 32
per cent.
Only eight of the original list of thirty-two countries were
on the gold standard 2duringthe third period. In five of
these countries gold prices advanced; the median gain was
2 per cent. In the twenty-four countries off the gold standard
domestic prices registered a median advance of i ipercent.
The gold equivalents of these domestic prices dropped, how-
ever, the median decline being 6 per cent. But the situation
as a whole clearly reflects a lessening of the downward pres-
sure on gold prices. Liquidation was checked, and the basis
of pric.e recovery was being laid. We deal with this phase in
later pages.
WORLD PRICE RELATIONS IN 1933
In discussing the structure of world prices as it existed in
1929 emphasis was placed on the effects of the long period
2Theintroduction of various types of exchange control renders it difficult,
in some cases, to distinguish gold standard from non-gold standard countries.
In September 1936thegovernment of France announced measures for the
reduction of the gold value of the franc. This step was followed by similar
action by the Netherlands and Switzerland, and at a later date by Italy.
International price relations, as well as the internal price structures of the
countries immediately concerned, will, of course, be profoundly affected by
these changes.THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 171
of economic non-intercourse(or of intercourse upon dis-
torted and necessarily temporary bases) which began in 1914
and which extended, for some countries, to the middle of the
decade of the 'twenties. As a result, in large part, of this non-
intercourse, world prices and other elements of the world
economic structure were not in gear when commercial and
financial relations were generally restored. Disproportionate
and unbalanced developments had occurred during the
preceding years in different parts of that structure. By 1929
definite progress towards a more stable basis of economic
intercourse had been made, though many of the faulty adjust-
ments growing out of the period of non-intercourse persisted.
We turn now to a brief survey of the situation existing early
in 1933, with reference to the structure of prices and costs
then prevailing. This will be done in general terms. Various
supporting data will be presented in the next section, in
which primary emphasis is placed upon the movements of
recovery. The discussion of the situation in 1933 may fall
under three headings, dealing with disparities in price levels,
disparities in production costs, and disparities in the prices
of commodities in certain groups of major importance.
DISPARITIES OF PRICE LEVELS
Unequal and considerable changes in national price levels,
occurring over a relatively short period, throw international
trading relations out of adjustment. This statement is axio-
matic, as applied to a world economic system that operates
on the basis of price relations; for any changes in the whole-
sale price levels of trading countries, particularly unequal
changes, will entail numerous and unequal changes in the
individual prices on which trading relations are based. Some
of these shifts may tend to stimulate the import or export
of particular commodities, but the net effect of wide altera-172 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
tions will be to destroy the prospects of profitable commerce
arid to cramp trade.3
The wide diversity of the declines in wholesale prices in
different countries between 1929 and 1933 has already been
noted. In terms of national currencies the price level in
Chile, in February .1933, was 79 per cent above that of 1929,
and in the Dutch East Indies, 50 per cent below that level.
These were the two extremes between which the other
tional price levels ranged. On a common gold basis the index
numbers, with reference to 1929 as ioo, range from 37 in
Japan to 89 in Chile (see Table '3). It is not surprising that
the delicate relations of trade suffered from these tremendous
inequalities of change. Here was one important factor in the
decline of 6i per cent in the aggregate value of world trade
and of 26 per cent in its volume, between 1929 and 1932.
(Other factors, notably rising tariff walls and the practical
cessation of international lending, contributed, of course, to
the trade decline.)
The 1929 standard of reference is not perfect. It is far
from certain that world economic relations in that year were
8Itis not true, of course, that unequal changes in national price structures
are always a causal factor in throwing international trading relations out of
adjustment. During a period of non-intercourse, or of intercourse restricted
by high quota or tariff barriers or other factors, the elements of national
price structures will inevitably get out of alignment. Price disparities develop
tinder these conditions because of restrictions on trade. But ii monetary or
other forces present during a general recession press upon national price
structures, bringing wide and unequal changes, the international price dis-
parities thus set up may play a causal role in checking the movements of
goods and forcing a readjustment of commercial relations. Not all the inter-
national price disparities that developed after 1929wereof this latter type,
but there is no doubt that a great many of them were. The violent changes
that price recession brought, all over the world, created conditions definitely
adverse to the continuance of trade upon existing terms. Itis true that
opportunities for new trade may be created by the very changes that impede
the previously existing trade, but the adaptation of national economies to
new conditions of world trade is a painfully slow process.THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 173
adjustedto continuing and effective international coopera-
tion. We may not assume, on the other hand, that pre-War
relations constitute an ideal standard against which to mea-
sure current conditions, but it is desirable that we view the
price relations of 1933 with reference to this earlier stand-
ard. In terms of national currencies and on a pre-War base
the price levels of 1933 were very widely scattered indeed
(see Table 14).Indexnumbers of wholesale prices ranged
from 72 for Egypt to 653 for Czechoslovakia and 1838 for
Bulgaria. Great differences in internal economic relations are
indicated by these widely discrepant figures. Commodity
prices in terms of gold were much more compactly grouped,
as is to be expected. Even here, however, the price level of
one country (Egypt) was cut in half over this twenty-year
period, while Chile, at the other extreme, had a price level
above that of 1913.
In this survey our interest is not in index numbers of
wholesale prices as mathematical abstractions. We have used
such measurements because we may learn something from a
study of their comparative values about the innumerable
individual relations that tie national economies together.
The existence of differences in average wholesale prices
means that similar (and greater) differences prevail among
the numerous elements of different national price structures
which must be in adjustment if the international exchange
of goods and of services is to be effected. The abnormalities
of the War years, the chaotic currency conditions of the years
immediately following and, finally, the tremendous economic
disturbances that began in 1929 all tended to shatter these
adjustments. During the two decades that followed 1914
national economies were exposed to the play of a wide vari-
ety of forces, differing greatly in strength and incidence from
country to country. A world economic system integrated over
more than forty years of peaceful development, during which174 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
its component parts were affected by the same general forces,
was shaken into separate elements. The forces playing upon
these elements tended to lose their common character, be-
coming specific and diverse. That these elements were out of
adjustment, and materially so, at the end of twenty years of
stormy weather, gives no cause for wonder. The wide diver-
gence of wholesale price levels in different countries consti-
tutes one evidence of deep-rooted international maladjust-
ment.
DISPARITIES OF PRODUCTION COSTS
Among the most important elements of national price
structures are the various costs that enter into the production
of the staple articles of international commerce. The com-
petitive positions of industrial countries in world markets
depend, obviously, upon relative production costs. The prof-
itability of trade depends upon the relations between these
costs and corresponding selling prices. When costs are out
of adjustment with possible selling prices, or when the rela-
tions among cost structures in different industrial countries
are suddenly disturbed, international trade is immediately
affected.
Production costs are determined by a host of elements—
wage rates, living costs, interest rates, the cost of materials,
fuel and power, the degree of development of mechanical
equipment and the technical arts, the skill of labor and many
other factors. When commercial relations among the trading
nations of the world have been maintained for some time a
condition approaching equilibrium is attained among their
cost structures, and the flow of trade is based upon these rela-
tions. Alterations are always occurring as wages, living costs,
industrial productivity and other factors change in the dif-
ferent countries, but such alterations are slow in normalTHE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE '75
times, and trade is adjusted to them without severe strain.
From 1929 to 1933,however,changes in production costs
and in the competitive positions of trading nations were
pronounced. These differences, superimposed upon those
already existing in 1929, modified substantially the relations
upon which trade had been based. The commercial chaos of
the depression period was due in no small degree to these
modifications.
A general cause of changes in the relations among the ele-
ments of production cost in different countries is found in
the unequal declines of price levels in these countries during
the depression and in the diversity of price movements that
preceded the depression; for wages and overhead charges are
notoriously slow to adapt themselves to changes in the value
of money. After a price rise such costs are relatively low;
after a price fall they are relatively high. In general those
countries that had passed through inflationary movements
prior to 1929 were characterized by low production costs in
that year, while countries that had passed through defla-
tionary movements were characterized by high production
costs.4 The inequalities of price declines between 1929 and
'933 introduced further modifications into the situation.
The nature of some of the notable changes that occurred
during recession in the competitive relations of different in-
dustrial countries is shown in Table i i.Hereindex numbers
measuring changes in the value of the dollar, in terms of
foreign currencies, are contrasted with index numbers of
food prices, cost of living and wage rates expressed as per-
4Italyconstituted something of an exception. Although Italy had passed
through an inflationary movement during the post.War era, the currency
had been stabilized at a level that was high, with reference to the domestic
ostructureof Italian prices and their relation to world prices at the time of
stabilization.176 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
centages of corresponding measurements for the United
States.
TABLE 11
INTERNATIONAL VALUES OF THE DOLLAR AND VARIOUS SERIES
RELATING TO PRODUCTION COSTS
A COMPARISON OF MOVEMENTS,
INDEX
NUMBERS OF VALUES INDEX NUMBERS
OF' THE DOLLAR IN ]N DECEMBER 1932 AS PER-
TERMS OF CURRENCIES CENTAGES OF CORRESI'ONDLNG MEA-
OF FOURTEEN COUNTRIES SUREMENTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
(1929=100)
Dec. Food Cost of Wage
1929 1932 prices living rates
UnitedStates ioo 100 100 100 100
Australia ioo ;85 ii6 94
Belgium 100 toO it6 ito 1078
Canada too 115 102 104 1078
Czechoslovakia ioo 100 139 123
120
Estonia 100 100 97 99 io88
France (Paris) ioo 100 134 1212 ii63
Germany too 100 115 100 92
Italy too 103 124 io6 100
Japan ioo 222 132 105 102
Netherlands ioo 100 ii8 io8 io6
NewZealand 100 i6i 113 105 97
Poland ioo 100 97 94 97
United Kingdom100 149 131 113 111
1Thistable follows the general formofone prepared by J.B.Condliffe,
appearingin his article "Exchange Rates and Prices" in the Index (Svenska
Handeisbanken), January 1935.(Amore extended discussion of the data and
techniques used is given in World Economic Survey, 1933—1934, League of
Nations,pp. 47—51.)Inthepresent table dollar values are used, rather than
sterlingvalues, as in Condliffe's table.
The basic data of exchange rates, cost of livingand food pricesare given
in the Statistical Year-Book, 1934—35,andthe Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
of the League of Nations. Wage rates are from the International Labour
Review (articles on of the General Level of 'Wages").
2 Lastquarter.
8Annual figure.THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 177
The interpretation of this table may be suggested with
reference to the measurements given for the United King-
dom. At the exchange prevailing in December 1932 the
dollar was worth 49 per cent more, in British pounds, than
in 1929. If the relations of 1929 were to be preserved, food
prices, wages and other elements of cost in the United King-
dom should also have been 49 per cent higher than the cor-
responding American figures, with reference to 1929 parity.
In fact, food prices were only 31 per cent higher, cost of
living 13 per cent higher, and wage rates ii per cent higher.5
These relations meant that the United Kingdom enjoyed a
competitive advantage over the United States in December
1932, to the extent that these various series truly represented
production costs, and in the degree that world markets were
open to free competition.
The various measurements in Table i i and the graphical
representation in Figure 8 are worthy of careful study, for
they summarize certain of the most significant aspects of
international trading relations at a date close to the bottom
of the depression. They indicate that Japan and five coun-
tries of the sterling bloc (Australia, Canada, Denmark, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom) stood in relatively favor-
able competitive positions at the end of 1932. Wages, living
costs and food prices—all important (and related) factors in
costs of production—had not risen commensurately with the
declines in the dollar values of their currencies. At the other
extreme, with costs high relatively to dollar costs and the
dollar values of their currencies, were France, Czechoslovakia,
Belgium and the Netherlands. In a middle group, not far
removed from the United States, stood Germany, Italy,
Estonia and Poland.
5Here,as inallinternational comparisons, we suffer from lack offull
comparability among available index numbers. The results should be taken
to define general relations only.i78 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
FIG,URE 8
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN PRODUCTION
COSTS, lg2g—1g32
Graph Showing Relative Amounts by which the Changes in Stated Series
relating to Production Costs in Various Countries Exceeded or Fell Short of
Changes in Corresponding Series for the United States. Account being Taken
of Relative Changes in the Values of National Currencies
(Measurements of percentage changes from 1929toDecember 1932)
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Themovement is shown as positive when the change in the country named
exceeded the change in the corresponding series for the United States;itis
shown as negative when the change was less than that in the series for the
United States.
The comparisons provided by Table i 1 are but samples
of many that might be made. The series of prices and wages
cited do not by any means measure all production costs. But
they are representative of the total, in indicating how ex-
treme were the international shifts in relative production
costs between 1929 and 1932. We should note, too, that 1929
is a rather dubious standard of reference, in this respect. It
is not proper to assume that production costs the world over
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through processes of devaluation while others, including the
United States and the United Kingdom, had nQt. Further,
we may not conclude that all international competition at
the end of 1932wasbased upon the relative costs shown in
Table i i; for such competition is between specific industries.
Actual costs in individual industries may depart very widely
indeed from averages representative of the entire body of a
nation's industries. But the measurements given serve their
purpose in suggesting the magnitude of the shifts in relative
production costs among industrial countries that recession
and depression had brought. This period and the decade and
a half of disturbance preceding had altered channels of in-
ternational trade that had been furrowed over long years of
peaceful development. Old established trading relations were
disrupted. The building up of new relations and their pro-
tection against dislocations through further fluctuations of
exchange rates or prices was one of the major tasks set by the
recession.
DISPARITIES OF COMMODITY PRICES
So,me of the extreme disparities that developed in national
and world price structures during the violent recession of
192o—2 ipersisted during the succeeding years, making deep
impresses upon economic conditions. Similar disparities,
many of them more severe, were opened up during the
world price recession that began in 1929. Three were of
exceptional importance in the world situation that developed
during the recession and depression: the cleavage between
the prices of goods of agricultural and of non-agricultural
origin, the cleavage between the prices of raw and of proc-
essed goods, and the discrepant movements of the prices of
goods intended for use in capital equipment and of goods
intended for ultimate human consumption. (The last-men-iSo PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
tioned class is broader than 'consumers' goods', which in-
clude only those commodities ready for final consumption.)
PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
High price variability is a characteristic of agricultural
products. Since the volume of agricultural production is not
readily adaptable to fluctuations in economic conditions, the
full impact of business changes is felt by prices. The post-
War weakness of agricultural prices, the world over, has
already been noted. With the coming of recession in 1929
various efforts to bolster agricultural prices collapsed, de-
clining demand for goods of agricultural origin was not
matched by decreases in output, and the checking of loans to
agricultural regions contributed a new element of weakness
to the competitive position of farm products. Price declines
of exceptional severity ensued.
The condition of agricultural producers throughout the
world as a result of the depression is common knowledge and
requires no extensive discussion at this point (for relevant
index numbers, see Table 19). The declines in agricultural
prices were most severe in the United States, Canada, New
Zealand, Argentina, and Finland, all countries in which agri-
cultural production plays an important role. In each of these
countries.thedrop in agricultural prices was much more
severe than that in general commodity prices. In certain
countries, notably France and England and Wales, the de-
clines in the prices of farm products were less than in general
wholesale prices. In these countries domestic agricultural
prices were not exposed to the full storm of price recession
that struck the great staples entering into world trade.THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE i8i
PRICES OF RAW AND PROCESSED GOODS
No characteristic of the post-War economic situation was
more striking or more fruitful of major consequences than
the gap that was opened from 1919 to 1921 between the
prices of industrial raw materials and of finished products.
Reversing trends that had persisted for many years, this
schism affected the course and character of international
trade, the distribution of capital, the relations of debtor and
creditor areas and the distribution of purchasing power
among consuming groups throughout the world over a dec-
ade and more. By 1929 the gap had narrowed somewhat,
but the narrowing was in some degree due to conditions that
were necessarily short-lived. Raw materials remained in a
weak position and the removal of certain adventitious props
helped to destroy such gains as they had made. We pass to a
summary of recent changes.
The recession that began in 1929 brought a growing diver-
gence between the prices of raw materials and of manufac-
tured goods, in world markets.6 All the effects that followed
upon the development of this situation in the early post-War
years were again felt, but with a force more disastrous to
world trade because certain alleviating circumstances previ-
ously present were absent after 1929. General financial and
economic conditions prevented the application of methods
of valorization, which had temporarily eased the earlier situ-
ation. The practical cessation of international lending re-
moved the possibility of sustaining the depleted purchasing
6Therewere certain exceptions to this general rule. Raw consumers goods
showed much greater strength than did raw materials destinedto pass
through the industrial machine. Again, the margin between the prices
raw and processed goods behaved in a distinctive fashion in Germany. That
country was unique during this period; it was a highly developed manufac-
turing country, yet it stood in a debtor relation to the commercial world in
general.182 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
power of raw material producing areas by means of new
loans, and these areas had no buckler to oppose to the storm
that broke upon them. Moreover, the normal international
obligations of such areas, for imported manufactured goods,
insurance, financial and shipping services, service upon capi-
tal loans secured from the great financial centers, had been
made even heavier by excessive loans, many for unproduc-
tive purposes, during the boom years that preceded the
recession. By a cruel conjuncture of circumstances, the price
schism was reopened at a time when raw material producers
were exposed on every flank to adverse forces.
Nor were industrial producers in much better case. Most
of the conditions that helped, earlier, to protect many indus-
trial elements (particularly in the United States) from the
adverse effects of the price schism, while preserving to them
the advantages that it offered, were absent from 1929 to 1933.
Installment selling was severely curtailed. The great ex-
pansion of capital exports that helped to open foreign mar-
kets to American producers in the first post-War decade
was not duplicated in the second decade. Fortuitous profits
from speculation were no longer available to swell buying
power. The impact upon the industrial structure of the
greatly reduced purchasing power of raw material producers
was apparent at once in increasing unemployment. (Other
elements, of course, contributed also to the volume of un-
employment.) The consequent reduction of the purchasing
power of industrial workers reacted to intensify the difficulty
and to swell still further the number of unemployed. De-
pleted purchasing power and misery on the one hand, unem-
ployment and misery on the other—these were the concomi-
tants of the sharp widening of the schism that separated the
prices of raw materials from those of finished goods.
One arresting fact about this great price gap that was
opened, or reopened, between 1929and1933 iS that it ap-THE WORLD
peared, internationally, as a division between two great
groups of countries. In most countries today both extractive
and manufacturing industries are found, but usually one
type of industry predominates and determines the general
character of the national economy. By and large, the coun-
tries of western Europe constitute a distinctively industrial
area, while the rest of the world, excluding small areas in
Asia and the industrialized regions of North America, is
devoted primarily to the extraction of raw materials and the
cultivation of crude foodstuffs. As we have noted, the price
schism of the first post-War recession and ensuing years
opened up a definite cleavage between industrial and colo-
nial areas, and this cleavage, together with related circum-
stances connected with the movements of capital, constituted
a dominant feature of the world economic scene during this
period. The same cleavage between manufacturing and raw
material producing areas became an outstanding feature of
the depression that began in
Thiscondition is clearly revealed by measurements of the
net barter terms of trade of industrial countries and of coun-
tries exporting raw materials and importing industrial prod-
ucts (Table i8). In 1932 the United Kingdom gave 13 per
cent less of exports, by volume, than in 1929, and 24 per cent
less than in 1913, in exchange for a fixed quantity of imports.
7Everycyclical depression, of course, has opened up a similar cleavage, since
the prices of raw materials are far more sensitive to changes in business
conditions than are the prices of manufactured goods. But in the present case
the cleavage differs so markedly from that usually developing in the course
of business cycles that itis not improper to use the term 'schism'. The
differences between the break here in question and that usually found in
business depressions are differences of magnitude, of duration and, fuñda-
mentally, of background. For the decade preceding the 1929breakwas a
decade of weakness in raw material prices. The schism of 1929—33 was
virtually an intensification of a condition that had been present in the
world economy since the ending of the War.PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
The reason, of course, is that the prices of imported food-
stuffs and materials had fallen much more than had the
average price of exported industrial products. The trading
relations of France, Germany and the United States with
the rest of the world were altered in similar fashion. In 1932
these three countries were giving, respectively, 13, 31 and i6
per cent less than in 1929 in exchange for constant quantities
of imports. At the other extreme are the colonial areas, sell-
ing foodstuffs and raw materials in exchange for industrial
products. In 1932 the terms of exchange had so altered for
New Zealand that it was forced to give 58 per cent more, in
volume, than in 1929, in return for a fixed quantity of im-
ports. For the Dutch East Indies the figure was 46 per cent,
for Argentina 52 per cent. Here in accentuated form was
the same great cleavage that had been opened up between
1919 and 1921.
PRICES OF INVESTMENT EQUIPMENT AND OF GOODS FOR HUMAN
CONSUMPTION
In the main, the price behavior of major commodity
groups during the recession and depression initiated in 1929
resembles that observed in previous cyclical recessions, al-
though in the most recent depression movements were more
extreme both in magnitude and duration. One important
difference isto be noted, however. In pre-War business
cycles the prices of those particular producers' goods that
are intended for use in the construction of capital equipment
fell as rapidly as the general price level, or more rapidly.
This facilitated the resumption of expenditures on new
capital equipment and on the repair of old capital equip-
ment during the later stages of depression and the early
stages of revival, and thus stimulated general business re-
covery. During the latest depression, as in the period preced-THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 185
ing the recession of 1929,theprices of goods entering into
capital equipment remained relatively high.
In most industrial countries for which we have appropriate
records depression prices of capital equipment were rela-
tively higher than the prices of goods intended for ultimate
human consumption. In Germany industrial finished goods
intended for the use of producers were only 17percent
lower in price in January 1933thanin 1929;industrial
finished goods for sale to final consumers were 35 per cent
lower. In Canada producers' equipment in February 1933
was8 per cent lower in price than in 1929;consumers'goods
were 27percent lower. In the United States, in February
1933, producers' goods intended for use as capital equipment
were 27percent lower than in 1929;consumers'goods were
35 per cent lower. This situationis connected with the
general raw-processed schism already discussed. Those raw
materials which were weakest in price were, in general, agri-
cultural products intended for human consumption. Fur-
thermore, the effects of control through cartels, agreements
and combinations of various sorts have been felt most di-
rectly by goods intended for use in capital equipment. It is
probable, too, that various fixed and relatively intractable
elements of cost played more important parts in the produc-
tion of goods of the capital equipment type than in the out-
put of consumption goods. The net result of all these circum-
stances (and of other economic conditions) was that in the
recent depression capital equipment became relatively more
expensive, and that its production was retarded. This tended
to remove one of the factors usually facilitating a revival of
economic activity after a severe depression.
It is notable that these price relations were reversed in
Japan. In June 1932theprices of Japanese producers' goods
were 48 per cent lower than in 1929;theprices of consumers'
goods wereper cent lower. Here was a condition of veryi86 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
great importance in facilitating, if not stimulating, the early
industrial recovery of Japan.
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF DISLOCATIONS IN THE WORLD PRICE
STRUCTURE DURING THE DEPRESSION
The collapse of prices, with resulting dislocations in the
world price structure, was but one aspect of the general eco-
nomic breakdown of the period 1929—33. In a situation
marked by a tremendous reduction in the volume of pro-
duction and trade, by world-wide unemployment, by virtual
cessation of the international flow of investment funds, by
widespread dislocation of the foreign exchanges, it would be
quite unjustifiable to look upon the price collapse as the one
factor responsible for all other economic difficulties. Yet we
have argued above that, be the first causes what they may,
the price relations created by such a general collapse as that
of 1929—33becomethemselves active factors in the economic
situation. The very conditions that prevent prices from re-
flecting and promptly adapting themselves to the violent
economic changes accompanying a major economic recession
initiate new chains of consequences. Some of these, which are
in part at least resultants of schisms and disparities set up
within the structure of world prices, are here summarized.
Sharp alterations of price relations bring in their wake
two major (and related) consequences—a shift of purchasing
power from group to group and, usually, a disturbance of
the balance that may have prevailed between the volume of
production and the available purchasing power.8 When the
distribution of purchasing power upon the basis of which an
8Theseresults would not follow, of course, if the effects of the price changes
upon purchasing power were precisely offset by variations in the volumes
of goods produced or services rendered by the economic groups. concerned.
such nicely balancing changes are not found in practice.THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 187
economic system has previously functioned is thus suddenly
altered, a violent drop in the volume of goods exchanged
may be expected. (Curtailed purchasing power is immedi-
ately reflected in reduced demand. Enhanced purchasing
power, real or potential, is likely to be effective only with a
time lag.) This is precisely what happened when the recent
price collapse occurred.
The purchasing power of raw material producing areas
was reduced, even before the collapse of raw material prices,
by the diminution of foreign loans, a process that began in
1928. When to this weakness was added the effect of rapidly
declining prices of their major products, the power of such
colonial areas to purchase industrial products was very seri-
ously impaired. In Table i 2 an attempt is made to appraise
roughly the losses in aggregate purchasing power due to these
two factors, for selected colonial areas.
TABLE 12
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN THE AGGREGATE PURCHASING POWER
IN WORLD MARKETS OF FIVE RAW MATERIAL
PRODUCING AREAS,
_z _OZZ




volume(per unit)value (per unit)
000
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1930 95 75 71 93 76 73 78
193k 104 52 54 77 70 49 64
1932 107 42 45 6o 75 36 6o
1933 109 39 42 52 8i 63
1Thefigures in this table are aggregates, derived from data relating to the
Union of South Africa, Argentina, Dutch East Indies, Australia and New
Zealand. Below are given records for the individual countries, as compiled
(Footnoteto Table12continued on p.188)i88 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
Between 1929 and 1933thegold value of the exports of
the five raw material exporting countries here represented
was reduced 58 per cent. This declinedue entirely to a
drop in the average gold price, per unit, of the goods ex-
ported; for the volume of exports in 1933 was greater than
that of 1929. Added to the loss in purchasing power resulting
from this price decline was the loss clue to a tremendous drop
(Footnote to Table 12continued)
by the Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations (Review of
World Trade, '934; Statistical Year-Book, '934—35; Balance of international
Payments, 1934).
APPROXIMATEVALUE OF
CAPITAL LOANS, IN MILLIONS
OF FORMER U. S. COLD DOLLARS
[NET INWARIJ (+) OR
EXI'ORTS OUTWARD (—)BALANCES]
Physical Gold price AggregateLong- Short-
volume (per unit) gold valueterm term Total
Union of South Africa -
1929 100 100 100 —8.6 +73.6 +65.0
1930 101 85 86 +48.2 —i6.6 +31.6
1931 91 So 73 +1.9 +17.1 +19.0
1932 98 73 72 +22.2 —97.7 —75.5
1933 91 75 67 —6.9 —23.9
Argentina *
1929 100 100 100 +48.7 —10.9 +37.8
1930 72 79 57 +175•7 —8.3 +167.4
1931 100 47 47 —5.9 +7-3 +1.4
1932 92 39
1933 83 38 31
DutchEast Indies
1929 100 100 100 —24.9 +56.7 +31.8
.1930 117 68 So +31.8 lacking +31.8
.1931 109 47 52 +13.7 +18.5 +32.2
1932 104 38 +11.3 +8.4 +19.7
1933 90 36 32 +6.0 +19.7
Australia* *
1929 100 100 100 +169.9
1930 95 75 71 +13.6
193! 112 46 52 —53.5
.1932 134 33 45 —52.5
1933 173 29 51. —78.9THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 189
inshort- and long-term loans. Such loans, which. amounted
to over 300 million dollars in 1929, had fallen to zero by
1931, and had taken on negative values in 1932 and 1933.
The flow of capital was outward. Capital movements do not
necessarily have a physical counterpart in the movement of
goods, but this shift in the movement of short- and long-term
funds contributed in no small degree to the weakness of raw
material producing areas. Falling exports and declining capi-
tal loans served, together, to reduce the total sum (in terms
gold dollars) available to these five countries in 1931 for
use in foreign markets by something over 50 per cent of the
1929 figure. By 1932 the decline amounted to 64 per cent,
(Footnote to Table 12 concluded)
APPROXIMATEVALUE OF
CAPITALLOANS, IN MILLIONS
OF FORMER U. S. COLD DOLLARS
INWARD (+) OR
EXPORTS OUTWARD BALANCES]
l'hysical Gold price AggregateLong- Short-
volume (per unit) gold valueterm term Total
New Zealand***
1929 100 100 100 —11.9 +30.6 +18.7
2930 103 77 79 +39.2
1931 104 53 54 +7-4
1932 117 37 42 —4•' +7-4 +3-3
1933 135 30 41 _1O.4 —6o.i _70.5
* Dataon capital loans are for the year October i—September
**Dataon capital loans are for the year July i—June 30.
Dataon capital loans are for the year April i—March 31.
The index numbers of the gold prices of imports, as given in Table 12,
are averages of index numbers for the individual countries; for 1932 and
1933, data for Australia were not available, and estimates for that country
were based on data for New Zealand.
Data on capital movements were not available for Argentina for 1932 and
1933. Estimates for these years were based upon data for the four other
countries.
The figures in the three columns relating to exports are derived inde-
pendently, hence all items in column are not consistent with corre-
sponding items in columns (i) and (2). In general, the discrepancy is small.190 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
and by 1933 to 67 per cent.9 If we measure from 1929 as
base, and take rough account of the fall in the average prices
of goods imported by these countries,'0 we find that reduced
exports and falling capital loans together would account for
a drop approximating 40 per cent in their purchasing power
in foreign markets, that is, in the physical volume of manu-
factured goods purchasable by the funds coming from these
two sources. (Part of these credits in foreign markets would,
of course, be used in debt service and for other purposes not
directly involving the purchase of goods.)
These records indicate how substantial was the reduction
in the flow of manufactured goods from industrial areas to
certain important raw material producing areas, and how im-
portant was the part played by price changes in this decline.
They reveal, also, the effect of the stoppage of capital move-
ments on the aggregate purchasing power of raw material
producing areas. For the world at large a decline in the vol-
ume of international trade in raw materials accompanied the
changes we have noted, although it did not approach the drop
in the volume of manufactured goods exported by industrial
countries.1' In international as in domestic trade the prices
9Otheritems in the balance of payments of these countries affect their
purchasing power in foreign markets. The above figures define changes due
to the influence of two important factors which were subject to considerable
variation over this period.
10Thefollowing index numbers measure changes in the average gold prices
of goods imported by these five countries.
1929 1930'93' 1932 1933
Unionof South Africa ioo 8i 62 42
Argentina ioo 88 71 6o 57
DutchEast Indies ioo 94 74 6i 5'
Australia ioo 98 8i
New Zealand ioo 95 77 58 50
(Reviewof World Trade, 1934, League of Nations, pp. 76—83)
11Thefollowing estimates, from the Review of World Trade, (p.i6)
issued by the Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations, incH-THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 191
ofmanufactured goods were maintained, relatively to the
prices of foodstuffs and other raw materials, and the rough
equalization of the aggregate values of goods exchanged thus
entailed a correspondingly greater decline in the volume of
manufactured goods entering into trade. In addition, of
course, the trade in manufactured goods among industrial
countries suffered great losses.
A large part of the decline in trade between raw material
producing areas and industrial areas may be attributed to the
effect of price disparities and the reduced volume of foreign
lending upon the purchasing power of colonial areas, and to
the effect of unemployment and wage reduction upon the
purchasing power of industrial areas. In trade between in-
dustrial areas direct price disparities play a less important
role. Here the reduced purchasing power of industrial work-
ers was a serious depressant. To these factors must be added
the important retarding influence of new and higher tariff
barriers. These, and the accompanying development of trade
restrictions, quotas and similar impediments to the move-
ment of goods in customary channels, intensified the depress-
ing influence of price disparities and unemployment and
served still further to reduce the purchasing power of con-
sumers generally.
PROBLEMS OF READJUSTMENT AND RECOVERY
World history in modern times has been a record of stead-
ily expanding international trade resting, in large part, upon
cate the relative magnitudes of the changes in the volume of trade of three
classes of commodities and in corresponding unit prices:
FOODSTUFFS RAW MATERIALS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES
Per unit Per unit Per Unit
prices, prices, prices.
Quantumin goldQuantumin gold Quantumin gold
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100
1932 90 52 8i 45 58 64192 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
the exploitation of the natural advantages of different eco-
nomic areas. (Accident and priorities of exploitation played
rather important roles, of course, in the regional division of
labor.) At the bottom of the spiral of recession in world
commerce and deflation of world prices, in 1932 and 1933,
the world faced a major question: Were the advantages of
regional economic specialization to be fully exploited in
the future or, in considerable part, foregone? In another
form, this was the question whether national or international
trade was to develop, relatively to the other.'2 The World
War and the economic and political difficulties growing out
of it posed this question for more conscious consideration,
perhaps, than it had ever received before.
The alternative lines of development, if clearly distin-
guished, involve sharply different economic policies. Na-
tionalistic development would be expected to proceed upon
the basis of maintained quantitative and other restrictions
upon imports, a slow shifting of national productive energies
to new channels and a correspondingly slow absorption of
unemployed workers and capital, the continuation of world
trade in low volume, relatively to world production, and the
persistence of living standards (as measured in terms of real
wages and incomes) below those that would be supported by
a full utilization of the world's productive resources. Inter-
national price and cost relations based upon earlier condi-
tions of freer trade would no longer prevail. Price and cost
1disparities'(in relation to earlier standards) would persist.
The international price system of the past, with national
price and cost structures standing in working relations one
with another and subject to mutual modification and read-
12Thequestion has been put in this form and its implications developed in
a paper by John H. Williams on "The World's Monetary Dilemma—Internal
versus External Monetary Stability" (Proceedings of the Academy of Political
Science, April 1934'pp.62—68).THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE
justment, would undergo a substantial change in character.'3
Readjustment and recovery to be effected through the
restoration of a working international organization would
require quite different foundations. Some lowering of the
barriers to world trade, particularly of those quantitative
restrictions that served as absolute impediments to equilib-
rium through price readjustment, was essential. Some resto-
ration of the international flow of capital was,if not a
necessary condition, at least of very considerable importance.
Finally, and of greatest weight, there were necessary the in-
terrelated price and exchange readjustments that would per-
mit the reconstruction on a stable basis of a world price
system, with national price and cost structures standing in
more effective working relation than was possible under the
disturbed conditions of the depression period. Such recon-
struction of a world price system would not, of course, mean
the restoration of the precise relations that prevailed prior
to the recession. Many deep-seated and irreversible changes
had occurred, and reconstruction would involve adaptation
to these. But if the path towards a recovery of international
trade were to be taken, it would be an adaptation that would
facilitate and not impede regional division of labor and the
growth of world commerce.
Looking forward, from the demoralized state of world
trade and world intercourse prevailing in 1932,afterthree
years of recession, these two clear alternatives were open,
but it was not to be expected that either would be followed
rigorously. In tracing the events of the succeeding years we
shall be concerned with the character of the compromise
actually effected between nationalistic commercial develop-
ment and an international economic organization.
13Alucid exposition of the effects upon price and cost relations of quantita-
tive restrictions upon international trade is given in "Exchange Rates and
Prices," by J. B. Condliffe, in Index (Svenska Handeisbanken), January 1935.194 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
WORLD PRICE MOVEMENTS IN RECOVERY
The general character of world price movements since the
checking of recession in 1932 and has been indicated in
the opening pages of this chapter. As various countries broke
loose from the gold standard the declines in their domestic
prices were stopped. In many instances fairly substantial
price advances have been scored, in terms of national cur-
rencies. The downward pressure on gold prices persisted, but
even here the lift of domestic price levels has been sufficient
to advance gold equivalents somewhat in several countries.
The movements of both sets of prices from 1929 levels to
the depression lows, and the subsequent advances, are graph-
ically portrayed in Figure 9. The extent of the advance from
the low point is indicated, for each country, by the white
area on the bar.
The degree of divergence among national price levels,
even in terms of gold values, is notable. The low points, with
reference to 1928 or 1929 high values as ioo, ranged from
29 for Japan to 64 for Germany. Some advances from de-
pression lows were scored in gold price levels to the spring
of 1936. In the main, these were inconsiderable. The sig-
nificance of certain of these movements is clouded by the
presence of official control over foreign exchanges. For the
world as a whole the recession of gold prices of commodities
had been checked by 1936 but substantial recovery was still
to come.
The bars relating to the movements of price levels in terms
of national currencies tell a somewhat more encouraging
story. Here, except in a few countries, the levels of the de-
pression lows were definitely left behind. Only the bars re-
lating to Poland and the Dutch East Indies show no white
areas. In Argentina, Peru and Chile, 1929 price levels wereTHE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE '95
FIGURE 9
WHOLESALE PRICES IN THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES, 1929-1936


































Thearrows in the section of the diagram relating to national currencies in-
dicate the relative levels of gold prices in March 1936.*ToOctober 1935.
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passed, in the advance. The United States, with a gain to
March 1936 of 33 per cent above the depression low, and
Japan with a gain of 30percent, are among the countries
having made the greatest advances. In the United Kingdom
wholesale commodity prices advanced 13percent.
The price gains of recovery, in terms of the various na-
tional currencies, are to be appraised with reference to gold
price levels, corresponding to current exchange rates. The
differences between the gold price levels as of March 1936
(indicatedby the arrows in the diagram) and the price levels
in terms of national currencies may be noted on the chart.
There is a rough inverse relationship; high national price
levels are associated with low gold price levels, and low na-
tional price levels with high gold price levels. But there is
far from a simple and invariant relationship between depre-
ciation, as measured by exchange rates, and domestic price
levels. In general, the advances of domestic prices have not
been commensurate with the depreciation of national cur-
rencies. Thus in the United States a reduction of 41percent
in the gold value of the dollar was followed by an advance,
to April 1936, of only 33 per cent in average wholesale
prices. (The advance is measured from the level prevailing
in February Suspensionof the gold standard dates
from April ig, 1933.)Arise commensurate with the reduc-
tion in gold value would have amounted to 69 per cent.
Similarly, quoted rates on the pound sterling, as of April
1936, represented a decline of 40percent in its gold value.
An equivalent price rise would have amounted to 66 per
cent. The actual advance in wholesale prices from the date
of departure from the gold standard to April 1936 amounted
to 13percent. There is, of course, no reason to expect a
rigid relationship between prices and the gold value of the
monetary unit under contemporary currency and• bank-
ing conditions, but the highly imperfect relationship in theseTHE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE '97
countries is worthy of note. Indeed, there is evidence that
currency depreciation by important commercial nations has
exerted deflationary pressure outside their borders, perhaps
in greater degree than it has exerted inflationary pressure
domestically. For the reduction of gold prices, which depre-
ciation entails, tends to push world gold prices downward,
and countries still on the gold standard feel the full force of
this push.14
THE STRUCTURE OF WORLD PRICES IN 1936
We have seen, in the early part of this chapter, that the
slow process of rebuilding a world trading organization
after the disruptive period of War and post-War disturbance
was violently checked in 1929. The innumerable cost and
price relations which condition the actual exchange of goods
and services were broken or seriously distorted during the
recession. Nationalistic political considerations intensified
economic factors in creating barriers to economic intercourse
and checking the flow of goods in international trade. As a
result of the play of these various forces the physical volume
of world trade was reduced 26 per cent between 1929 and
1932.
In the brief previous survey of the situation existing at
the low point of the depression and in the early months of 1936
attention was drawn to the disparate movements of prices
and costs, and to some of their economic consequences. We
turn now to the changes occurring during the period of
general world recovery.
DISPARITIES OF PRICE LEVELS
In following the movements of price recovery it is well to
compare situations at specific dates, although the depression
14SeeCommercial Banks, 1929—1934(Leagueof Nations, Geneva, 1935).198 PRICESIN RtCESSION AND
lows of different countries did not coincide. For convenience,
February 1933maybe taken as a standard date at which to
compare the price levels of depression. March 1936 will serve
as a bench-mark in surveying the changes of recovery.
From 1929toFebruary 1933 the changes in wholesale
price levels, in terms of the national currencies of the thirty-
two countries covered in Table 13, ranged from a drop of
50 per cent in the Dutch East Indies to a rise of 79 per cent
for Chile. The median decline (unweighted) was 30 per
cent. The degree of divergence of national price levels during
TABLE 13
WHOLESALEPRICE INDEX NUMBERS, THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES,
1929—MARCH 1936
(Interms of national and gold currencies:
NATIONALCURRENCIES COLD VALUES
Average Feb.Mar.Average Feb.Mar.
1929 1933 19361929 1933 1936
Dutch East Indies 1 100 50 43 ioo 50 43
Netherlands1 100 52 55 100 52 55
Bulgaria2 100 53 55 100 53 55
Belgium 2 100 6o 68 too 6o 49
India, Calcutta ioo 6i 64 100 43 39
Italy 2 100 6t 724 100 59 664
Egypt, Cairo 100 62 76 100 44 46
Poland 1 100 63 54 100 63 54
United States 100 84 100 63 49
France 1 100 64 6o 100 64 6o
Switzerland 1 zoo 64 64 zoo 64 64
Canada zoo 66 76 100 56 45
Germany 2 100 66 76 100 66 76
Jugoslavia 2 100 68 70 100 52 54
Hungary 2 100 6g 75 too 6g 75
Estonia 2 100 70 77 100 70 47
Latvia 2 100 70 73 100 '70 73
Czechoslovakia2 100 72 77 100 72 64
United Kingdom ioo 72 8o 100 51 48
Australia 100 74 82 100 41 40
Unionof South Africa ioo 75
8 865 100 53
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TABLE 13 (cont.)
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX NUMBERS, THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES,
1929—MARCH 1936
NATIONAL CURRENCIES GOLD VALUES
Average Feb.Mar.Average Feb.Mar.
1929 '933 1936 .1929 '933 £936
Sweden ioo 76 84 100 51 48
Norway ioo 8i 8g 100 53 49
Austria 2 100 82 83 100 66 65
Japan 2 100 82 87 100 37 32
Denmark2 100 83 93 100 47 45
New Zealand ioo 88 93 100 50 45
Argentina 2 100 89 102 100 54 39
Finland ioo 91 93 100 54 48
Peru 100 92 103 100 40 38
Spain2 100 g6 100 100 54 55
Chile 2 100 179 187 100 8g 46
Median
Unweighted 100 70 77 100 54 49
Weighted 6 100 66 8o 100 59 49
Index of dispersion of price levels
Unweighted 13.6 12.3 12.5 12.8
Weighted6 6.8 7.5 11.0 12.2
souacE:League of Nations: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
1 Countries on gold standard, March 1936.2 Official foreign exchange control.
3 January 1933. 4October'935. 5April1936.
6Weights are based upon relative importance of foreign trade in 1929.
thisperiod is indicated by an index (unweighted) of 13.6
per cent.'5 In terms of gold values the median decline was
greater, amounting to 46 per cent. The index of dispersion
was slightly lower than that for domestic price levels mea-
sured in the various national currencies. Some of the impli-
cations of these wide disparities have already been suggested.
From February 1933 to March 1936 the median of the
15 This is half the range between the two quartiles, expressed as a percentage
of the median.200 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
thirty-two wholesale price indexes, in national currencies, rose
about io per cent. The dispersion of price levels was only
slightly reduced; disparities of national price levels remained
wide in 1936.
If we reduce our measurements to terms of a common
denominator, gold, we note a continuation of the price drop
from 1933 to 1936,withthe median index of gold prices in
March 1936 less than one-half the 1929 level. The index of
relative dispersion of gold price levels rose slightly with re-
covery; between February 1933 and March 1936 there was an
increase rather than a reduction in the disparities the recession
had brought among national price levels, if we use the 1929
situation as criterion.
The picture is altered somewhat if we use the various
weighted measurements of average price change and of dis-
persion. Notably, the price rise from 1933 to 1936 in terms
of domestic currencies is much greater, 2 i per cent as against
io per cent. This means that price gains were greatest among
the commercially important countries. Dispersion of price
levels, on the other hand, is less when weights are used. It is
significant that the dispersion of commodity prices in terms
of gold, from 1929 to 1933 and to 1936, was greater than the
dispersion of prices in terms of national currencies. Standards
for international trading relations were badly shattered
among the leading countries.'6
18Thevarious national index numbers brought together in Table 13are
not fully comparable, since they differ in respect of number and kind of
commodities included and in method of construction. A. L. Bowley and
K. C. Smith have constructed a series of index numbers of wholesale prices,
for eleven countries, that are similar in composition and in distribution of
weights. Though the number of commodities included in each index is not
large(about the comparability ofthese measurements gives them
especial significance, in the tracing of international price movements. Re-
cession and recovery in these index numbers, in terms of national currencies,THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 201
Price index numbers on. the 1929 base relate to a standard
of somewhat uncertain economic significance. There is no
reason to believe that the relations of that year represent a
state of equilibrium. Indeed, no post-War year would serve,
if this test were applied, and pre-War years are so far removed
from the situation immediately preceding the 1929 recession
that they constitute unsatisfactory criteria. Yet it is desirable
that the changes of the period 1929—36 be viewed against a
standard other than that of 1929. Table 14 facilitates such
a view.
In terms of national currencies wholesale price levels in
the twenty-nine countries here represented scored a median
advance (unweighted) of 47 per cent between 1913 and 1929.
Recession carried the median level down to a point 6 per
cent above that of 1913, while recovery to March 1936
brought an advance to i8 per cent above. The employment
of gold as a common denominator gives a different picture.
Wholesale price levels in gold terms advanced 37 per cent
are shown below. For the present purpose the bases of these index numbers
have been shifted from 1925,asoriginally computed, to 1929.
FebruaryMarc/i
1929 1933 1936
Belgium 100 58 64
Canada 100 55 68
France 100 65 63
Germany 100 66 75
Italy 100 64
Netherlands 100 48 52
NewZealand 100 84t
Sweden 100 70 84
Union of South Africa 100 73** 80-f
UnitedKingdom 100 68
United States 100 50 74
*Notavailable. •*January1933. 1-February1930.
TheBowley-Smith index numbers are published currently in the Bulletin
of the London and Cambridge Economic Service.202 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
from 1913 to 1929. Early in 1933 the median index was 26
per cent below the 1913 standard; by March 1936 this had
been carried to a level 33 per cent below. (Weighted and
unweighted averages show the same general movements.)
With only one exception (Germany) average gold prices of
commodities at wholesale in 1936 were lower than in 1913.
A considerable degree of divergence among national price
levels is to be expected, over a period of two decades. It is
important, however, to determine whether the changes of
recent years have brought an accentuation or a reduction of
the disparities among price levels that developed during the
War and the immediate post-War years. Unweighted mea-
sures of dispersion indicate a sharp divergence of national
price levels from 1929 to 1933, a very slight reduction of this
divergence by March 1936. Re-valuation occurred in a
ber of countries, and the various domestic price levels' and
price structures stood far apart indeed. Weighted measure-
ments show the same changes, in less pronounced form.
When prices are reduced to gold terms, on the 1913 base, the
unweighted measurements indicate no material change in
dispersion between 1929 and 1933, a considerable advance
during the three years following. The weighted measure-
TABLE 14
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX NUMBERS, TWENTY-NINE COUNTRIES,
1936
(Interms of national and gold currencies:
NATIONAL CURRENCIES COLD VALUES
Aver- Aver- Aver- Aver-
ageageFeb.Mar. ageageFeb.Mar.
191319291933£936 1913£92919331936
Egypt (Cairo) ioo3ii6 72 83 1003ii6 51 53
Dutch East Indies 1 100 148 7464 100 148 74 64
Netherlands' ioo142 74 78 100 142 74 78
Estonia2 100 117 82 90 100 117 82 55
Hungary2 ioo 121 83 91 100 104 72 79THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 203
TABLE 14 (cont.)
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX NUMBERS, TWENTY-NINE COUNTRIES,
i9i3_MARCH 1936
NATIONAL CURRENCIES GOLD VALUES
Aver- Aver- Aver- Aver-
ageageFeb.Mar. ageageFeb.Mar.
1913192919331936 1913192919331936
Latvia2 100120 84 87 100120 84 87
India (Calcutta) ioo3141 86 91 lOOn158 68 62
United States 100137 86 114 100137 86 67
Union of South Africa ioo ii6 874 1006ioo ii6 624606
Switzerlandl 141 90 91 jQØ3141 90 91
Germany2 100 137 91 104 100 137 91 104
Canada 100 149 99 113 100 149 83 67
United Kingdom ioo 136 gg 110 100 136 70 66
Austria2 130 io6 107 i00893 62 6i
Sweden ioo 140io6uS 100 140 72 67
Argentina 2 100128113130 100125 67 49
Norway 100 149 121 132 100 149 79 73
Australia ioo i66 122 137 100i66 69 66
Denmark 2 100150124139 100150 71 68
NewZealand 100147130137 100147 73 66
Japan 2 too i66 136 144 100155 57 46
Spain2 100 i68 162 u68 100 73 75
Peru 100i86 172 192 100 156 62 6o
Italy2 100481 2933485 100131 78 875
Chile 2 100192345 360 100ui8 105 55
France 1 100627404376 100 127 82 76
Belgium2 851 512 578 1008124 75 6i
Czechoslovakia 2 8 653 703 1008134 96 86
BulgarIa2 1008344718381910 iOOS145 76 79
Median
Unweighted 100 147 io6uS 100137 74 67
Weighted 7 too 99 114 100 137 78 67
Index of dispersion
Unweighted 12.937.035.2 9.2 9.1 13.1
WeightedI io.619.2 15.4 2.610.3 7.5
SOURCE:League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
1 Countries on gold standard, March 1936. 2 Official foreign exchange control.
81914. 4January1933.
5 October 1935. 6April 1936.
7Weightsbased upon relative importance of foreign trade in 1929.204 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ments show a remarkably small degree of divergence of gold
price levels in 1929, on the 1913 base (a somewhat fortui-
tolls result, due to the fact that the price indexes for the
three most heavily weighted countries—United States, United
Kingdom and Germany—were within one point of one an-
other in 1929). Thereafter the divergence increased mate-
rially with depression, declined somewhat from 1933 to 1936.
Itis a fair assumption that unequal movements of national
price levels alter adjustments of prices and costs on which
international trade is based. These movements may open
some opportunities for profitable trade, but the net effect is
probably adverse. The various measurements of dispersion
just reviewed indicate a definite increase of divergencies
from 1929 to 1933, a movement that was particularly pro-
nounced in terms of national currencies. Thereafter, with
general recovery, there was some lessening of disparities,
though the picture as a whole shows no substantial improve-
ment for the commercial world in general. International
price divergencies remained wide in 1936,whetherthe stand-
ard of reference be 1929 or 1913. There is nothing sacred
about these standards, it is true, except that each represents
conditions under which trade had been carried on in con-
siderable volume. The movements of recovery, through the
early months of were far from restoring either set of
conditions. But we must consider other types of evidence
bearing on international price and cost relations.
DISPARITIES OF PRODUCTION COSTS
Lagging adaptation of various prices and wage rates to
alterations in the value of money may lead to rather wide
differences in relative production costs during a period of
rapid and unequal variations in price levels and in exchange
rates. Since we have no direct and comparable measure-THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 205
ments of production costs in different industrial countries
we are obliged to estimate relative changes. This was done at
an earlier point for the period of recession. There we found
that in December 1932 Japan and five countries of the ster-
ling bloc stood in relatively strong competitive positions,
since wages, food prices and other living costs had not risen
by amounts commensurate with the declines in the external
values of their currencies. France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium
and the Netherlands constituted a relatively high cost group;
the United States and a small number of European countries
were in a middle position. We may now trace the changes
brought by three years of currency depreciation, continuing
decline in gold prices, and varying price advances in terms
of national currencies (Table 15).
The changes in the international values of the dollar re-
sulting from American departure from the gold standard are
revealed by a comparison of the entries for December 1932
and for December 1933. In only four countries (Australia,
New Zealand, Denmark and Japan) was the 1933 value above
that of 1929. But we may pass directly to astudyof the
situation. As of December in that year the value of the dollar
was higher than in 1929 in the currencies of four countries
(Australia, Denmark, Japan and New Zealand), equal to the
1929 value in the currency of one country (Canada), and
below the 1929 values in the currencies of nine countries
(Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom). We are here
concerned, however, not with changes in the relative values
of these various national currencies but with the degree to
which food prices, living costs and wages may have adapted
themselves to these shifting relations among national cur-
rencies. The movements from 1929 to March 1936areshown
graphically in Figure '0.
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FIGURE 10
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN PRODUCTION
COSTS, 1929—1935
Graph Showing Relative Amounts by which the Changes in Stated Series
relating to Production Costs in Various Countries Exceeded or Fell Short ci
Changes in Corresponding Series for the United States, Account being Taken
of Relative Changes in the Values of National Currencies
(Measurements of percentage changes from 1929toDecember 1935)














Percentage I • I • I • I I • I •
-50 0 +50 —50 0 +50-100 —50 0 +50
Themovement is shown as positive when the change in the country named
exceeded the change in the corresponding series for the United States; it is
shown as negative when the change was less than that in the series for the
United States.
petitive position ill1935, relatively to the United States.
The value of the dollar in December 1935 was 59 per cent
higher than in 1929,interms of Japanese currency. The vari-
ous Japanese internal series that we are using as indexes of
relative production costs would have been approximately 59
per cent above the corresponding American figures, on the
1929 base, if costs had been adjusted to the changed yen-
dollar relationship. Actually they were far below that level.
Living costs and fOod prices were, respectively, only 5 and i 2
per cent above the United States figures, and wage rates208 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
were 17percent below. Also in relatively strong positions,
although with no such margin of apparent advantage as that
of Japan, were New Zealand and Australia. Canada, Estonia
and the United Kingdom stood on terms of approximate
parity with the United States.
Typical of the countries in positions of relative disadvan-
tage in 1935isFrance. The value of the dollar in terms of
the franc was 41percent lower in December 1935 than in
1929.Butwage rates had changed by the same amount, rela-
tively, as in the United States, living costs were 5 per cent
higher in France, and food prices were only io per cent
lower. There appears to have been no reduction in internal
costs corresponding to the advance in the external value of
the franc. With France, although in less pronounced posi-
tions of competitive disadvantage, stood Czechoslovakia,
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. (The list does not
purport to be complete, since we are restricted to countries
for which reasonably comparable index numbers are avail-
able.)
The measurements of living costs, wages, etc., which we
have used as indexes of relative production costs, provide
only rough approximations to the actual competitive posi-
tions of different countries. But there is no reason to doubt
the essential truth of the picture we secure from Table 15.
Thechanges in relative values of national currencies and in
internal prices and costs that occurred between 1929and
1935workedhavoc with the international cost relations in
terms of which international trade was being re-established
in 1929.Indeed,the magnitude of the differences developing
is perhaps not sufficiently emphasized in Table 15,sincethe
United States, which is the standard of reference, stands
roughly in the middle of the divergent economies. If we
compare Japan with France we have the accompanying
measurements. Over this period of six years the value of theTHE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 209
INDEX INDEXNUMBERSIN DECEMBER 1935
NUMBERS OF THE OF VARIOUSSERIESRELATING TO PRO-
VALUE OF THE FRANC DUCTION COSTS, AS PERCENTAGES OF COR
IN TERMS OF THE YEN RESPONDING MEASUREMENTS FOR FRANCE
(1929=100)
Dec. Food Cost of Wage
1929 1935 prices living rates
France 100 100 100 100 100
Japan. ioo 270 124 100 85
franc increased 170 per cent, in terms of the yen. The vari-
ous domestic series for Japan should have risen by roughly
equal amounts, relatively to those of France, if general equal-
ity of competitive position were to be maintained. But they
did not. Food prices in Japan rose 24 per cent more than did
food prices in France, cost of living paralleled the correspond-
ing French series, and wage rates fell to a level 15 per cent
below those of France. The measurements provide a striking
example of the disorganization of competitive relations
wrought by currency depreciation and divergent price and
cost movements between 1929 and 1935.
As regards the relations between national cost structures,
then, 1935 presents a disorganized picture. The worl.d was
not yet adapted to the suddenly-created differences of the
several years preceding; it could not be so adapted without
wrenching existing national productive organizations still
further. Nor did the newly-established quotas and heightened
tariff barriers promise to expedite a return to earlier trading
relations. In spite of many signs of domestic improvement
the condition of international trade remained black and un-
promising at the end of 1935.17
iT Devaluation in France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Italy, which was
announced in September and October 1936, promised to effect substantial
alterations in the relations shown in Table 15. The re-establishment of cur-
rency relations with other countriesclosertothose of 1929 would be
expected to remove some of the worst disparities among the series relating
to production costs.210 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
DISPARITIES OF COMMODITY PRICES
In earlier pages attention has been drawn to the post-War
appearance, and persistence, of a world-wide schism between
the prices of raw materials and manufactured goods. One
phase of this was the price disparity between agricultural and
industrial products, which was so marked a feature of the
post-War situation in the United States. Recession accen-
tuated the difficulties of a cohdjtion which had, indeed, been
in considerable part corrected by 1929. The figures in Table
i6, which define movements in the per unit purchasing
power of raw materials in exchange for general commodities
at wholesale in various countries, indicate the effects of
world movements on this situation between 1932 and 1936.
TABLE i6
PER UNIT PURCHASING POWER AT WHOLESALE OF IMPORTANT
RAW MATERIALS, 1913-1936
(Purchasing power is measured in terms of alt commodities at wholesale
in the country to which the raw material quotation relates.)
Feb. Feb.




U. S., Chicago ioo6o8893 .10097588690
Rice
France, Marseilles ioo70716610078555552
U. S., New Orleans ioo8612612010073639288
Sugar
England,London ioo8564671006i 524041
U.S., New York ioo112100io6ioo8o8g8o84
Coffee
Netherlands, Amsterdam ioo8946471001131005253
U. S., New York ioo714851zoo123875962THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 211
TABLEi6(cont.)
PER UNIT PURCHASING POWER AT WHOLESALE OF IMPORTANT
RAW MATERIALS,
(Purchasing power is measured in terms of all commodities at wholesale
in the country to which the raw material quotation relates.)
Feb. Feb..
19291932 1935 19361913 19291932.19351936
Tea
England, London ioo70115126 10010372119130
Netherlands,Amsterdam iou7595104 100ii888112122




U. S., New York ioo8858581007466 43 43
Tobacco
Netherlands, Amsterdam ioo97 848i100293286245237
U.S., Louisville 10062130113 10013885178155
Lard
U. S., New York 1006i144110 1008o4911588
Nitrateof soda
U. S., New York 100io8707010064 6g45 45
France, Dunkerque 100120125111 100 7287 go 8o
Cotton
England, London ioo688373100io874 79
U. S., NewOrleans 10050 76 73 100107538z78
Wool
England, London ioo 71881071001148o100121
U.S., Boston ioo68 87io6 100129 88112136
Silk
U.S., NewYork 10045 41 10099453841
France,Lyon 10048 3742 100g8 47 36 41
Japan, Yokohama 100 72646710088 64 576o
Hides,cattle
England, London ioo8299100 100 7259 7172
U. S., Chicago 1005391101 10068 626g
Pig iron
Germany, Essen 100115101100100 8295 8a




Germany, Berlin 10045 35 39 10087 393034
U.S. 10046575910084 4850
00
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TABLEi6(cont.)
PER UNIT PURCHASING POWER AT WHOLESALE OF IMPORTANT
RAWMATERIALS,1913—1936
(Purchasingpower is measured in terms of all commodities at wholesale
in the country to which the raw material quotation relates.)
Feb. Feb.
19291932 '9351936 19131929 1932 1935 1936
Lead
England,London ioo6979 86 100 6473 8o
U. S., New York ioo 69 72 78 100113 788i89
Germany,Berlin ioo 52 54 59 1008846 47 52
France,Paris ioo65 85 100 g662798i
Zinc
England, London 100 73 73 76 100 8o5g58 6i
U. S.,New York 100 71 8290 100 86 6i 71 78
Germany, Hamburg ioo 57 51 52 100 45 41 41
France, Paris 100 66 83 76 10086 57 71 65
Tin
England,London 1008g142127 100746610594
U.S., NewYork 100 71133125 10074 53 98 92
Rubber
England,London 10044 7790 10020 9 i6 18
U.S., New York 100 25 72 89 100 i8 5 13 i6
Newsprint
Canada, Ottawa 100 8o 82 too84 95 67 6g
Sweden 100107 86 100 848g 72 71
Beef,fresh
France, Paris ioo120107109 ioo89107 g697
U. S., Chicago 100 8391 87 100130109it8114
Mutton,fresh
France,Paris ioo125144125 100115143165143
U. S., NewYork ioo 73 74 66 100100 73 74 66
England, London 100 88105 8g1001109611598
Germany,Berlin ioo 107110 100101 86io8iii
Pork, fresh
Germany, Berlin 1008o8g91 100io886g6g8
France, Paris ioo114 8297 10011312993110
U. S., Chicago 100 63125114 100103 129ii8
England, London ioo8492 85100119100110101
From1929 to 1932rawmaterials declined in relative worth
in 47 of the 58 markets represented in Table i6. From 1932THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 213
to February 1936 there were further declines in 22 of these
markets, advances in 34. The measurements on the 1913 base
throw light on the longer swings of the prices of foodstuffs
and basic materials. In 1929, 37 of the 58 quotations in world
markets reflected losses in the trading relations of primary
producers, with reference to pre-War conditions. (In most
instances the 1929 positions of primary producers were much
stronger than those prevailing in the early years of the dec-
ade.) In 1932, 50 were below their pre-War parities with
general commodities; by February 1936 this number had
been reduced to 45. Here is evidence of some improvement
in the trading positions of primary producers but the posi-
tion of 1929, or that of 1913, was by no means restored.
These measurements define changes in the trading rela-
tions of primary products for general commodities within
the various countries represented. The base of reference in
each instance is the wholesale price index of the given coun-
try, in terms of national currencies. But these varying stand-
ards do not furnish the basis of international trade. In Table
17 we are able to follow the price movements of primary
products with reference to broader standards. These mea-
surements, constructed by the Economist, trace changes in the
sterling and dollar prices of primary products, and in their
corresponding gold prices, from the date of the departure
of the United Kingdom from the gold standard.
Sterling prices of primary products advanced 12 to 14 per
cent with the dropping of the gold standard by England in
September 1931. Fluctuations followed; but without notable
change in the average level until the, end of 1933. Further
advances in the sterling price of gold contributed to elevate
the sterling prices of primary products to a level some 20 to
30 per cent above that of September 1931. The dollar prices214 PRICESIN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
TABLE17
PRICESOF PRIMARY PRODUCTS, 1931-1936
(In national currencies and in gold)
PRICES OF PRICES OF
PRIMARY PRODUCTS 1 PRICES OF GOLD 2 PRIMARYPRODUCTS
British AmericanBritish American British American
.1931 (sterling)(dollar) (sterling)(dollar) (gold)(gold)
Sept.i8 zoo ioo 100 100 100 100
Sept.30 112 95 124 100 90 95
Oct.28 114 101 124 100 92 101
Nov.25 115 gB 132 100 87 98
Dec.3° 117 94 142 100 82 94
1932
Jan.27 ii6 94 141 100 82 94
Feb.24 121 90 140 100 86 90
Mar.22 112 86 84 86
Apr.20 105 84 130 100 8i 84
June29 99 8o 135 100 74 So
july27 104 84 137 100 76 84
Aug.24 112 89 140 100 So 89
Sept.21 117 90 140 100 84 90
Oct. 19 112 84 144 100 78 84
Nov. 112 78 154 100 73 78
Dec.28 109 77 146 100 75 77
'933
Jan.25 io8 78 143 100 76 78
Feb.22 104 143 100 73 77
Mar.22 104 So 142 100 73 8o
Apr.19 105 8g 141 109 74 82
May3' ii6 io8 146 iig 8o 91
June28 ii8 117 144 130 82 91
July26 121 125 146 139 90
Aug.23 117 119 148 138 79 86
Sept.20 117 121 157 155 74 78
Oct. i8 113 109 155 142 73 77
Nov.29 115 117 148 157 78 75
Dcc.13 115 117 148 154 77 76
'934
Jan. ii8 125 157 75 76
Feb.28 121 128 i6i i68
Mar.28 121 128 i6o i68 76 76
Apr.25 120 125 i6o i6g 75 74THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 215
TABLE (cont.)
° OFPRIMARY PRODUCTS, 1931-1936
PRICESOF PRICES OF
PRIMARY PRODUCTS 1 PRICES OF GOLDZ PRIMARY PRODUCTS
BritishAmericanBritish Americanifritish American
1934 (sterling)(dollar) (sterling)(dollar) (gold)(gold)
May23 121 129 i6i i6g 76 76
June20 123 134 162 i68 76 8o
Julyi8 125 137 162 i68 77 St
Aug.29 129 151 164 171 79 88
Sept.26 126 149 i66 170 76 88
Oct.24 124 146 164 169 76 87
Nov.21 120 149 164 i68 73 89
Dec.19 123 154 166 i68 74 92
1935
Jan.30 125 152 167 167 74 91
Feb.27 124 154 170 167 73 92
Mar.27 123 148 '7' i68 72 88
Apr.24 124 152 169 i68 74 90
May22 128 167 i68 76 go
June19 126 144 166 169 76
July31 127 146 i66 i6g 76 86
Aug.28 126 141 165 i6g 84
Sept.25 131 149 i66 i68 79 88
Oct.23 134 145 i66 169 8o 86
Nov.20 131 144 i66 i68 79 86
Dec.i8 131 142 i66 169 79 84
1936
Jan.29 132 146 i66 170 8o 86
Feb.26 133 145 i66 171 So 85
Mar.25 134 144 i66 169 8i 85
Apr.29 133 143 i66 i68 8o 85
May27 130 140 164 i68 79 84
i. Computedby the Economist from the wholesale prices of important raw
materials. The list given by the Economist includes:
Wheat Cocoa Wool Lead
Maize Sugar Cottonseed oil Pig iron
Oats Lard Copper Petroleum
Linseed Bacon Tin
Coffee Cotton Rubber
(Notes to Table 17concludedon p.216)216 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
of primary products fell during 1931and1932, reaching a
low point in the early months of 1933. With depreciation of
the dollar and a sharp increase in domestic business activity
the dollar prices of these products advanced about 6o per
cent in the spring and early summer of 1933. Thereafter
there was no substantial change until the spring of 1934,
despite further advances in the dollar price of gold. Drought
and crop scarcity in 1934 brought a sharp rise in the dollar
prices of primary products, and in their American gold prices.
Although the sterling and dollar prices of gold stood at the
same general levels from 1934 to 1936, the dollar prices of
primary products were consistently higher than the sterling
prices. Domestic conditions in the United States contributed
to this differential.
The very considerable recoveries of primary products in
sterling and dollar prices are to be contrasted with the cor-
responding changes in their gold values, in British and
American markets. These stood, in 1936, 15to20 per cent
below the 1931 level. The gold prices of primary products in
the United States advanced with the upswing of 1934, and
later retained part of this gain.
The great international schism between the prices of basic
materials and industrial finished products that was re-opened
by the recession of 1929 had been somewhat lessened by the
early months of 1936. Certain basic commodities had re-
gained a substantial part of their lost purchasing power;
others still stood in positions of marked disadvantage. These
relations are vividly brought out by measurements defining
(Notes to Table 17concluded)
The prices of these commodities with the exception of wool were taken
from various American markets; the wool quotation is taken from Le Havre.
2Goldprices are based upon exchange rates, not on Treasury quotations.THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 217
changesin the net barter terms of trade of leading industrial
and raw material producing countries (Table i8). These
TABLEi8
NET BARTER TERMS OF TRADE FOR EIGHT COUNTRIES,'
1913—1935
1929 1932 1934 1935'913.7921 1929 1932 1934 1935
United Kingdom ioo 87 84 87 100 8288767476
France 100 87 85 84 10095105 91 8g 88
Germany 100697479 100 95 65 70 76
United States too84 79 77 100 78 95 8t 75 73
Hungary iooio8 gy8g 100156ii6127113104
New Zealand ioo158129 100135 92145119
Argentina too152145 100159107162156
Dutch East Indies ioo146136
iThe index numbers of importand export prices from which these measure-
ments are derived are given in Review of World Trade, .7934(League of
Nations, Geneva, 1935),p.82.
measurements, which may be taken to define changes in the
physical volume of exports required to pay for a fixed quan-
tity of imported goods, are derived from index numbers of
the prices of goods entering into foreign trade. An index of
prices of goods imported by a given country, divided by an
index of prices of goods exported by that country, on the
same base, yields an index of net barter terms of trade.'8
The divergent fortunes of industrial and colonial areas
between 1929 and 1932 are clearly revealed by the indexes
in Table i8. In the four industrial countries listed first we
note declines ranging from i6 to 3]. per cent in the volume
18Theuse of average prices of imported and exported goods in deriving
measurements ofthis type involves the assumption that no substantial
changes occur in the physical character of a country's export and import
trade. This assumption is reasonably valid in respect of changes over short
periods; it is far less sound as regards changes over one or two decades.218 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
of exports exchangeable for a fixed quantity of imports; in
the remaining four countries, which are heavy exporters of
primary products, the volume of exports given in exchange
for a fixed quantity of imports increased from 8 to 58 per
cent. The several years following brought some amelioration
of these conditions. But in 1935 the net barter terms of trade
remained distinctly favorable to industrial countries, un-
favorable to areas exporting raw materials. A shift of base
to 1913 shows a somewhat more extreme cleavage between
these two groups of countries. Trading relations of 1935
were far removed from those of pre-War days.
Turning now to primary products of agricultural origin,
we find a notable difference persisting between their prices
in important industrial countries and in areas producing
primarily for export (Table 19). These index numbers mea-
sure changes in agricultural prices relatively to the movement
of general wholesale prices. Thus if the index for agricultural
TABLE 19
PER UNIT PURCHASING POWER OF AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES, 1913—1935
(Interms Of all commodities at wholesale)
Dec. Dec.
192919321935193519131929193219351935
Argentina too 62 70 75
Canada too 69 83 86 100 io8 74 90 92
England and Wales lao ii6 iii ioosio6 120 124 119
Finland 100 8i 83
France 100 122 105 107 100 92113 97 99
Germany too too io6 107 100 95 95 100 102
Italy too 103 1092 100 io6 110 1152
Netherlandsl 100 100 io8 104
NewZealand ioo 62 72 75 109 68 79 82
Poland 100 99 95 95
United States '00 68 8g 88 100 io8 73 g6 94
1 Crop year. 31911—13=100
2August. 4 1909—13100THE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 219
pricesdeclines, in terms of this standard, it means that the
prices of non-agricultural commodities have advanced, rela-
tively. This happened between 1929and1932forall the
countries listed in Table 19exceptGermany, France, Eng-
land, Italy and the Netherlands. In the main, these were
protected areas for agricultural producers, in which pref-
erential advantages in home markets were given to domestic
producers. In the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Ar-
gentina and Finland agricultural products lost substantially
in relative worth, following the currents prevailing in world
markets. Recovery, to December 1935,hadfailed to restore
farm products to their 1929paritywith commodities in gen-
eral in the countries just listed, although appreciable im-
provement had occurred. In France some of the relative
advantage enjoyed by agricultural producers had been lost,
but agricultural producers in the industrial countries of
Western Europe retained substantial advantages. No world
level of agricultural prices existed in 1935.Theeffects of
nationalistic economic policies are clearly manifest in their
divergent movements after 1929.
Wehave noted that at the low point of the depression
world price relations were definitely unfavorable to recovery
of the capital goods industries. In Germany, in Canada, in
the United States the prices of goods for use in capital equip-
ment were high, as compared with commodities in general.
Liquidation had left them on a plateau above the general
price level. Japap was a notable exception. By early 1936
thiscondition had been materially improved in the United
States, although construction costs remained high. Available
measurements indicate some lessening, relatively, of the costs
of capital goods elsewhere. The actual prices of such goods
advanced in Japan, but they remained well below prices in
general.
The record of world changes from 1932to1936,inphysical220 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
terms, showed very substantial gains in production in a num-
ber of countries. For four years the general movement was
one of irregular and spotty recovery. This was not a single
great movement, however; it was rather of the nature of a
series of national gains, largely disconnected. Considerable
advances were scored in Japan, Great Britain, the United
States and other countries, but each national movement ap-
peared to be definitely limited in its international effects.
The gains in world trade during this period were not com-
mensurate with the recoveries shown by domestic records.
(Japan increased the volume of its export trade materially,
but th.is movement was exceptional.) Over these years the
world was following a path of nationalistic development. No
working international organization had been restored. Na-
tional self-sufficiency rather than regional specialization was
the keynote of the time, as was strikingly manifest in the
concurrent industrialization of colonial areas and the pres-
sure towards agricultural development within industrial
nations.
The price movements of the period of recession and re-
covery reflected the trend away from an international or-
ganization and towards a nationalistic system. We have traced
the divergence of national price levels and the disparate
changes of factors related to production costs. The price
bases of world trading relations had been profoundly dis-
turbed by these movements. By 1936somefavorable de-
velopments had occurred. The world-wide schism between
the prices of raw materials and of manufactured goods had
been lessened. Some recovery had been made in world trade.
Progressive depreciation of currencies had been checked.
Announcement in September of sympathetic cooperation
between England, France and the United States in the
stabilization of exchange relations marked a forward step of
great significance. But serious difficulties persisted. DisparateTHE WORLD PRICE STRUCTURE 221
pricelevels and widely different cost relations re-enforced pro-
hibitive tariffs and quota restrictions in checking commercial
intercourse. A world price structure, with its national ele-
ments mutually adjusted, had not yet been restored.